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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROB-
ER TS, G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the 
Board of County Commissioners for Utah 
County, and as the County Board of Equal-
ization, and as individual taxpayers in Utah 
County; HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah 
County Assessor; ELWOOD L. SUND-
BERG, as Utah County Auditor; MAU-
RICE C. BIRD as Utah County Treasurer; 
C. STEVEN HATCH, as a resident and 
taxpayer of Utah County. 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, 
-vs. -
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant, Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
Case 
No. ll369 
INITIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This matter is before this honorable court on appeal 
and cross-appeal from a decision of the Fourth District 
Court, Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge. It presents 
iievcral questions relating to the validity of tax assess-
ment procedures and particular assessments, and of in-
tergovernmental relationships as between the Utah State 
1 
Tax Commission (hereinafter ref erred to as ''respond-
ent," "defendant" and "the Commission") and the 
county officials listed (hereinafter referred to as '' appel-
lants," "plaintiffs" and "the Utah County Officials") 
in relation to ad valorem valuation assessment and 
taxation on a county level. The question arose in the 
frame of reference of certain assessments based upon 
appraisals made by the State Tax Commission in Utah 
County, in cooperation with the Utah County Assessor, 
as part of the Commission's state-wide cyclical assess-
ment program. The case is framed as an action for de-
claratory judgment with relief sought for prospective 
operation only, and has no executory consequence as to 
any public instrumentalities or taxpayers. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial, argument and consideration of briefs 
of counsel, the lower court on June 12, 1968 rendered a 
memorandum decision (R. 145-153) and subsequently, on 
August 15, 1968, signed amended findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and declaratory judgment (R. 187-199) iu 
final disposition of the matter before it. 
The lower court found some issues in favor of plain-
tiffs and some in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs appealed 
011 September 3, 1968, and therefore are appellants and 
cross-respondents, and defendant appealed on SeptemlJer 
12, 1968, and is therefore designated as respondent and 
cross-appellant for purposes of the hearing before this 
court. In connection with its appeal, defendant filed a 
statement of points (R. 215-A) pursuant to Rule 75 (cl), 
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U.R.C.P., to draw the attention of the court to the ques-
tiolls it desires considered on appeal and the type of re-
lief that defendant considers would properly and with 
finality dispose of the significant questions here involved 
in the best interests of the public. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Commission seeks an affirmation of the lower 
court's decision insofar as it relates to the matters raised 
by plaintiff's' appeal, a reversal of the lower court's de-
cision in relation to those matters brought to its attention 
by the appeal and statement of points prepared by de-
fendant; respondent also requests that the court exercise 
its discretionary powers to wholly resolve certain prob-
lems herein involved, as set forth in Point IV of this 
brief. 
Because of the complexity of this case, its public im-
portance and the desire of all parties concerned to expe-
dite proceedings herein as much as is possible, both par-
ties have simultaneously prepared and submitted initial 
briefs dealing with the bases of their respective appeal, 
and each subsequently may file responsive briefs answer-
ing the initial briefs. This procedure is adopted pur-
suant to stipulation of the parties and order of this hon-
orable court signed by Chief Justice J. Allen Crockett 
under date of October 15, 1968. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'rlie facts in this case, in their proper legal and his-
torical frames of reference, are of cardinal significance 
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m this hearing and will therefore be set forth in mor0 
detail than is typical in a brief on appeal. The chronol-
ogy herein involved logically breaks down into four dif-
ferent stages, which will be dealt with in order: 
( 1) The V a2uations 
In 1961 the State Tax Commission commenced a 
cyclical reappraisal of real property (without improve-
ments) throughout the state (Tr. 187-189). 1 Work was 
done by the Valuations Division of the State Tax Com-
mission and in cooperation with local officials. By 1965 
substantial parts of Salt Lake, Juab and Kane Counties 
had been completed, and work was commenced in Utah 
County (and soon after in Grand, Millard and San Juan) 
(R. 188). This work was commenced pursuant to a leg-
islative directive: 
The state tax commission on a continuous county-
by-county rotation basis and in co-operation with 
the various county assessors shall make a valua-
tion of all taxable property in each county at least 
once every five years. Section 59-5-46.1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
Between 1953 (when this statute was passed) and 1960, 
one cycle of revaluation and assessment adjustment had 
been completed in the state, but the record is not clear 
as to the details of the cycle since there was a complete 
turnover in county and Tax Commission officials between 
1960 and the time of trial (Tr. 189, 233, 238). 
i In the record in this case, the transcript pages are numbered sepa-
rately from the remainder of the record, as are the multi-page exhibits. 
References to "Tr." arc to the transcript of trial, "R." to the numbered 
pages of the record, and the exhibits will be referred to by number. 
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Basic responsibility for land valuation and assess-
ment in a county is that of the county assessor. Section 
59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1963), pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
The county assessor must, before the fifteenth 
day of April of each year, ascertain the names of 
all taxable inhabitants and all property in the 
county subject to taxation except such as is re-
quired to be assessed by the state tax commission 
and must assess such property to the person by 
whom it was owned or claimed, or in whose pos-
session or control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of the 
first day of January next preceding, and at its 
value on that date; ... .Assessors shall become 
fully acquainted with all property in their respec-
tive counties, and are required to visit each sepa.-
ra.te district or precinct either in person or by 
deputy, anrnually, arnd in person or by deputy arn-
nually to ~pect the property they are required 
to assess. (Emphasis added.) 
The law further requires that each year assessors 
sign a sworn statement to the effect that they have in-
spected all properties and met these statutory obliga-
tions. Section 59-5-30, Utah Code Annotated, as amend-
ed ( 1961). All assessors have signed such statements 
yearly, in spite of the fact that they have not met these 
obligations. 
This default of county assessors generally and of 
th0 Utah County Assessor in particular is clearly evi-
denced in the record (Tr. 185-187). In Utah County, for 
example, valuations had not been updated for about 
ten years prior to 1967, when the valuations which are 
the subject matter of this action were placed upon the 
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rolls (R. 187-188). Even though the record suggests 
that the assessors are not completely at fault since they 
do not have at their disposal funds and trained personnel 
sufficient to meet their statutory obligations, the fact re-
mains that in Utah County (as in virtually every other 
county in the state) locally-assessed properties have 
been for years assessed at dramatically lower rates than 
state-assessed properties (P. Exh. 3, Def. Exh. 11). As 
will be elaborated upon in some detail in Point IV, this 
situation is by no means unique to this jurisdiction but 
is found in many states. 
The Commission based its decision to come into 
Utah County at the time it did upon four criteria, which 
it considered in each determination as to where to send 
its appraisal teams (Tr. 190-196): 
1. CooRDINATION OF EFFORT. Experience of past years 
has shown that the best quality of appraisal work, and 
the most expeditious completion as well, is assured when 
land appraisers work simultaneously with structure ap-
praisers in a given locality. Structure appraisers had 
gone into Utah County shortly before the land appraisers 
were seut in (Tr. 191-192). 
2. ROTATION. The Commission attempts to work the 
various counties in an approximately cyclical order, hut 
,-aries somewhat therefrom because economic conditions 
may cause more rapidly growing disparaties in one coun-
ty thm1 in others in any given time period. Exact rota-
tional order will be deviated from when a pragmatic 
analysis of nll c:ireurm;tances suggests that the problems 
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in one area are considerably greater than those in another 
area whose "turn" it might otherwise be. Indeed, if 
exact order had been followed based upon the prior 
cycle, the appraisers would have probably been into Utah 
County a couple of years earlier than they in fact were 
(Tr. 239). 
3. COEFFICIENT OF DISPERSION. The coefficient of dis-
person factor describes the quality of assessments with-
in a given geographic unit. While the assessment level 
reveals average level of assessment prevailing in a unit, 
the coefficient dispersion factors show how individual 
assessments within a given unit vary from that average. 
rrlrn higher the coefficient of dispersion, the less satis-
factory is the quality and the greater the deviation in 
individual assessments from the actual average. The 
coefficients of dispersion in 1965 in Utah County on city 
and town lots were 35 percent and on urban lots, 33 per 
cent. These figures are high and indicate considerable 
lack of uniformity of assessment and taxation within 
the county and approximate those which exsited in We-
her, Box Elder and Cache Counties at that time, these 
counties being the most seriously variant of those on the 
Wasatch Front (Pl. Exh. 3, Tr. 192-193).2 
2 The coefficient of dispersion problem makes unfeasible a simple blanket 
increase to a certain level, for example 30 per cent of fair cash value, based 
upon a simple raising of the average assessment level. If, for example, the 
average assessment level in geographic unit wa~ 15 per ce11;t but the coeffi-
cient of dispersion high - say 30 per cent - a simple doubhng ?f the assess-
ment level would bring the average to 30 per cent, but result. m some tax-
payers paying on the basis of 40 or 60 or 80 per cent <;>f fair cash value 
while others continue to pay on an assessment substantially less than 30 
per leent. 
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4. AVERAGE AssESSMENT LEVEL. Where the average 
assessment level is lowest, taxpayers are assuming a 
share of the tax burden most variant from that assumed 
by other taxpayers in the state and that they should be 
assuming. In 1965 the assessment levels in Utah Coun-
ty were ·within a percentage point or two of the bottom 
in the Wasatch Front area, throughout which comparable 
assessment problems exist (Pl. Exh. 3). 3 
The attention of the court is directed at this time to 
a document in evidence entitled ''Assessment Levels of 
Locally Assessed Real Property in Utah by Significant 
Sub-classes 1967" (Pl. Exh. 3). This is typical of the 
assessment level studies which have become increasingly 
common in the various states in the last two decades and 
are now prepared by the supervising tax authority in 
most states. Because of these studies, the law in cases 
involving discrepancies in valuation and assessment has 
undergone a significant metamorphosis since World War 
II, and the recent cases involving relief by mandate and 
long-term systematic plans (see points IV and V) to 
bring valuations and assessment levels into uniform line 
had their genesis in these studies. 4 
The great advantage of these studies is, of course, 
that they enable a reviewing court to determine almost at 
3 The four criteria have been set forth, not to defend the Commission's 
decision to go into Utah County, which ~as discretionary and within t~e 
power of the Commission to make, but simply to explain the manner m 
which it was made. 
4 As noted by Charles F. Conlon, Executive Director of, and Chief Coun-
sel for, the Federation of Tax Administrators, and perhaps the most know!· 
edgable and lucid contempo_rary _authority in this are~ <;>f the law: . 
A discussion of the JUd1nal impact of the adm1111strat10n of prope_rt) 
taxes would be incomplete without some comment on the part winch 
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a glance where a complainant stands in relation to other 
persons, how the assessment level in one given geographi-
cal area compares with the level in other areas and how 
' the assessment level of one class of property compares 
with the level of other classes.5 
The evidence shows (Tr. 90-91) that the County As-
sessor of Utah County in 1965, Mr. Guy H. Ivins, ex-
tended to the Commission his cooperation and support as 
valuation work commenced in Utah County, even though 
the actual participation of his office was limited. 
The techniques utilized by the state appraisers m 
Utah County included actual physical inspection of each 
parcel of land, studies of appropriate sales data and 
other relevant data, and consultation in relation to each 
parcel with three local experts on the Utah County real 
estate market (Tr. 217). In 1965 and 1966 all the city 
and town and urban lots in Orem and all in Provo, ex-
assessment ratio studies have played in this development. It seems to 
me that without any question, the availability of (mostly) officially com-
piled assessment ratio data has more than any other factor persuaded 
the courts that a departure from traditional procedures was warranted 
in the discrimination cases, and that under some circumstances the 
court should use its powers to order officials to observe the standards 
laid down in the statutes and constitutional provisions governing the 
assessment of property. 
Assessment ratio studies have now become a standard tool in the 
assessment field. They are conducted with some frequency in nearly 
two-thirds of the states, and it is likely that the use of this procedure will 
become even more common. Certainly, such studies are a necessity in 
any effective state supervisory program. The Property Tax Today; 
Impact of Recent Judicial Decisions in T~e Property T~x: Pro~lems and 
Potentials, pp. 54-55, Princeton Tax Institute of Amenca (1961). 
s Cases illustrative of the uses courts are making of these studies include 
Townshi/J of North Bergen v. Division of Tax Appeals, 40 N .. 1: .super. 510, 
123 A.2d 456 (1956), aff'd sub non; Town of Kearney v. Dzviswn of Tax 
A/1/1,,als, 24 N.J. 90, 130 A.2d 845 (1947); People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, 
11/. & o. R. R., 22 Ill. 2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961); Kents 2124 Atlantic 
.·hn1ue, 34 N. J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961). 
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cept a vt>ry small segment, were completed (R. 187). All 
told, about 16,000 parcels were done. Since the values of 
almoRt all parcels had lain dormant for several years, 
drama tic increases in valuation, and subsequently in tax-
ation, resulted. The average assessment level in Orem, 
for example, for unimproved realty in 1966 was 10.16 
per cent of fair cash value; after the new valuations were 
placed on the valuation rolls, it was 19.77 per cent. Com-
parably, in east Provo the figures rose from 12.38 per 
cent to 19.66 per cent, and in west Provo, from 10.66 
per cent to 19.96 per cent (Pl. Exh. 3, p. 17). The Com-
mission's efforts were designed to raise the assessment 
level to 20 per cent of fair cash value as a part of the 
CommiRsion's over-all program. This program also in-
cludes a plan to bring all structures in the state up to 20 
per cent of fair market value by 1971 (the average is 
c.urrently 18 per cent) ; state-assessed properties are 
near the statutory requirement of 30 per cent at the 
present time and personal property near 26 per cent. 
The Commission's plan is to stabilize buildings and land 
at or as near as possible to 20 per cent of fair market 
valm~ and then bring them en masse to 30 per cent (Tr. 
107, JlG-117). 
The assessment levels of the various classes of prop-
erty i11 Utah and in Utah County for 1967, after the val-
uations anived at through the reappraisal above re-
f erred to >Vere placed upon the Utah County assessment 
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rolls, are here tabulated (Def. Exh. 10, 11; Tr. 106-110, 




Person- Utili- Level (All 
Land Buildings alty ties Mines Properties) 
State ________ 12.60 18 26 28 30 22.02 
Utah 
County 15 19 26 28 30 21.38 
As will subsqeuently appear in this brief, respondent 
deems these figures to be of extreme significance in this 
case. 
The record shows that the values of the various 
parcels, once determined and agreed upon with the local 
consultants, were placed upon the "house cards" in the 
assessor's officei with the acquiescence of the assessor. 
From there, they were placed by the assessor's office on 
the so-called ''blotters,'' and the notices sent out in early 
l!J67 to the affected property owners reflected these 
values. No complaint or objection was made at, or prior 
to, this time by any of the affected county officials to the 
effect that the valuations were either in error or uncon-
stitutional, and these values were placed in due course 
by plaintiffs on the county assessment rolls, and over 95 
prr cent of taxes ultimately paid in 1967 in Provo and 
Orem on the properties in question were based upon these 
values. 
6 "Weighted" means that the percentages are wei~hte? according to the 
total amount of property in each class in the determmat10n of the over-all 
011c1age (See Def. Exh. JO, 11 for illustration). 
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The lower court determined, however, that these 
valuations were void as contravening the uniformity and 
equality provisions of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3, of 
the Utah Constitution. 7 
The court also found that the reassessment work 
being done ''did not or could not achieve or work toward 
uniformity and equality'' of valuations and assessments. 
The position of respondent is that this program obviously 
did not achieve uniformity and equality (exact uniform-
ity being out of the realm of possibility) but that it clear-
ly worked toward the same. 
(2) County Board Actions 
Because of the dramatic increase in assessments and 
the wide publicity and discussion invoked thereby, the 
Utah County Board of Equalization received a great 
many requests for equalization, both from individual 
taxpayers and from groups representing numerous tax-
payers (R. 189). They commenced their hearings, con-
ducted pursuant to Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
7 Much was made in the court's memorandum decision of the length 
of time that has been consumed to date in the current cycle. The evidence 
on this point is subject to a variety of interpretations, and any effort to 
make a projection based upon work done to determine how long it would 
take to complete the cycle must be an educated guess at best, but the court 
apparently determined that an additional dozen years would be necessary 
(R. 150) . The position of defendant is that this is a reasonable, but not 
not the only reasonable, interpretation of the evidence,. that even if the 
court's projection is correct the valuations should be sustained, but the esti-
mate is probably somewhat excessive since that part that has been d?ne is 
the city and town lots in the area in question, and these _are the most d1fficul~ 
and most volatile parts of any county. For example, m Utah County 32.6 
per cent of the parcels have now been completed, which is only about 211z 
per cent of the area but about !iO per cent of the land, based upon assessed 
valuation in the countv (R. 188-189) _ Similar comparisons can be made Ill 
the other counties wherein work has been done. 
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1953, on May 31, 1967, and continued the same until July 
Gth of that year (R. 189). On July 10th, they took the 
final action in disposition of these requests for equaliza-
tion, which is relevant to this appeal, the county minutes 
for that date showing (R. 131-132): 
Commissioner Roberts moved that the legitimate 
Class I agricultural land in an agricultural zone 
be assessed at an appraised value of $500.00 per 
acre with other lands in an agricultural zone pro-
rated according to class and also that agricultural 
land not in a strictly agricultural zone but used 
for legitimate farming be valued at $650.00 per 
acre for Class I and with other lands prorated 
according to class, seconded by Commissioner 
Hinckley and passed unanimously. 
Although the hearings proceeded beyond the June 
20th deadline set in the controlling statute,8 the County 
Board did not request permission to reconvene beyond 
that date as provided in Section 59-5-46(10), Utah Code 
e 59-7-l. The board of county commissioners is the county board of 
equalization and must meet on the 31st day of May in each year to exam-
ine the assessment books and equalize the assessment of property in the 
county, including the assessment for general taxes of all cities and towns 
situated therein. It must continue in session for that purpose from time 
to time until the business of equalizing is disposed of, but not later than 
the 20th day of June, except as otherwise provided. All complaints regard-
ing the assessment of property where notice of the decision of the county 
board of equalization thereon has not been given to the taxpayer on or prior 
to June 30, and all such complaints not disposed of or decided by said board 
on or prior to said date shall be deemed to have been denied on said date 
and no notice of such denial need be given. And it shall meet on the third 
Tuesday of January, February, March and April of each year, excep~ in 
counties where the population does not exceed 2500 persons as determmed 
hv the latest decennial census, it may meet only on the third Tuesday of 
April of each year, at the discretion of the respec~ive board_ of county com-
missioners of said counties thus affected to equaltze valuations of personal 
property, the tax on which has been collected under the provisions of ~ection 
59-10-4, and failure of any such taxpayer to appear at the first me~tmg of 
the board of equalization after assessment of his per~onal property ts m~de 
Ii) the county assessor shall bar him from any reltef, and the valuation 
plaLcd by the assessor shall stand. 
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A11notat0d, aR amended (1959) (R. 189). In the absence 
of such request, the Commission naturally did not extend 
such permission. 
Tlw lower court held that the board was inundated 
with complaints, that it proceeded with due diligence, 
that a quorum ·was present at all times and that the board 
acted only on complai11ts filed before June 20 (R. 189). 
Defendant does not challenge these findings, but does 
assert that the court erred in finding (and in part in-
ferring) that the board based its determination on sales 
transactions and other valid criteria, that it endeavored 
to make assessed values uniform and equal throughout 
the county, and that it was not bound by the June 20th 
deadline. Argument in relation to this will be found in 
point V of this brief and in the responsive brief. 
In connection with this phase of the events that led 
to these proceedings, two parts of the record are of par-
ticular significance, and defendant directs the attention 
of the court to these : 
1. The minutes of the County Board of Equaliza-
tion (Pl. Exli. 8). 
2. A stipulated exhibit (Def. Exh. 4) which sets 
forth, in relation to each parcel of subject property, the 
sPrial number, the owner of record, the original 196i 
assessed niluation, the adjusted assessed valuation as 
tlctermi1wd by the Utah County Board of Equalization, 
the fiual figures arrived at by the Commission follmving 
its n.•a;-:;sessnwuts, the dates of the controlling hearings 
and t]1(' <·lnss of propprty (agricultural, residential, ck.) 
of eael1 pared. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the actions of the 
Board of Equalization gave relief to only approximately 
700 of the owners of the properties which were ap-
praised in the Commission's program. Owners of ap-
proximately 15,300 of these properties paid taxes based 
upon these appraisals. 
(3) State Review 
The Commission reviewed and studied the actions of 
the Utah County Board of Equalization. Subsequent to 
the events last described, and following several attempts 
at informal resolution, the Commission, being of the 
opinion that the County Board's actions amount not to 
equalization but to an attempt at a substitute assessment 
based upon unconstitutional and erroneous standards or 
(more likely) wholesale disguised abatements, com-
menced formal rectification action. The initial step was 
sending to each affected taxpayer, commencing August 
30, notices of intention to reassess the subject properties, 
and therein the Commission followed generally the pro-
cedure set forth in Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended (1959). Approximately 700 scheduled hear-
ings were held in Orem and Provo for five days com-
mencing September 11, and in almost all cases the tax-
payer appeared to protest either in person or through 
('.Olll1sel. On two of these days the director of the Prop-
('rty Tax Division of the Commission, Mr. Max H. Kerr, 
~;at in for one of the Commissioners who had been called 
out of state, but l\Ir. Kerr simply forwarded the in-
formation obtained to the Commission, and did not par-
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ticipate in the decision-making process of the Commis-
siou, which was collectiYe in all cases (R. 190). 
At the end of each day, the Commission sent a notice 
to the Utah County Auditor to the effect that the ques-
tions of valuation were "taken under advisement" (R. 
27-55, 190), and thereafter an investigation of each com-
plaint, of ten including a physical inspection of the prem-
ises, \vas then conducted (Tr. 122-123). The Commission 
determinations as to value, following their deliberations, 
roughly followed the original assessments, but there was 
some variation in 39.4 per cent of the cases. Immediately 
following October 1, 1967, the affected taxpayers and 
the county auditor were notified of these decisions 
(R. 190). 
The lower court found that these procedures were 
Yoid because of the time lapse between the hearings and 
the final redeterminations, and further, in part, because 
.:\lr. Kerr could not legally sit as a hearing offiicer. 9 
( 4) Judicial Proceedings 
As it became obvious that there were questions 
raised in the course of events set forth in the preceding 
paragraphs that would require a court determination, the 
9 The position of the Commission is that Section 59-5-47, Utah Code 
A1111otatPd. as amcnclecl (1959) should be interpreted liberally to effectuate 
the policy of the same, just and uniform assessments, and that the. Com-
rnissio11 in fact complied with the substance of this section and, m the 
altci 11atiH', even if under .'lection 59-5-47 the Commission actions were defec-
Li\e, these are s11s1ainahle under the Commission's general powers and the 
sp<'(ilic language in Se1 tions 59-5-46, Utah Code Annotated, as amende~ 
(ILJ'i'l). and 'ilJ-1-13, l1tJh Code Annotated, as amended (1961). (See Pomt \ 
in this brief. ;rnd Point Iii in 1espo11sive brief). 
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Commission filed on October 11, 1967, in this honorable 
court a petition for extraordinary relief., 0 
At the same time this petition was being prepared, 
a complaint (R. 3) was being prepared by plaintiffs and 
was filed under date of October 6, 1967, in the District 
Court of Utah County. 
The Supreme Court denied the Commission's peti-
tion for extraordinary relief, and the matter was re-
moved to district court. An additional petition for ex-
traordinary relief was filed in district court (R. 59-65) 
hy the office of the Attorney General on behalf of the 
Commission, which is in some particulars similar to the 
one filed in the Supreme Court, but this, too, was denied. 
The district court heard the evidence and argument 
and on June 12, 1968, issued its memorandum decision. 
In the final paragraph thereof, counsel for the Commis-
sion was instructed to prepare findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and judgment (R. 153). No time limit was 
set forth. Because of some unfortunate circumstances, 
largely beyond control of the Commission and its coun-
sel, including an inopportune lapse by the United States 
Post Office, the court on July 29th, and without notice 
to counsel for the Commission or the opportunity for a 
, o This action was prompted by the Commission's feeling that the issues 
were of such public significance that an immediate determination was desir-
able and that were the assessments of the County Board of Equalization to 
stand a revenue loss of over $30,000 would result. The Utah County offi-
tials, through their counsel, took the position at the hearing on this peti-
tion that no revenue would be lost, since corrected assessment notices could 
be sent out if necessary following determination of the legal issues. Tl1;e 
Commission did not agree with this interpretation of the law, and at this 
point it appears that whatever the outcome of this case, the monies are in 
Lllt lost. 
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hearing, signed findings, conclusions and a judgment pre-
pared by counsel for the Utah County Officials. Many 
findings were made from the memorandum decision, oth-
ers solely from the pleadings and evidence of the plain-
tiffs. No findings were based on the Commission's plead-
ings and evidence. .Motions were filed to expand and 
balance these papers and some modification was made as 
evidenced in the final documents, but most of the pro-
posed changes (largely additions) were disallowed. 11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RELIEF GRANTED TO PLAINTIFFS 
IN DECLARING VOID THE ASSESSMENT 
BASED UPON THE COMMISSION'S AP-
PRAISAL PROGRAM WAS NOT AN APPRO-
PRIATE RELIEF TO GRANT TO THESE 
PLAINTIFFS IN THIS LAWSUIT. 
One of the significant questions in this case is as to 
the standing the plaintiffs have in court to challenge 
the valuations here in question; a closely related, and 
1 1 "Ve recognize that it was wholly within the court's discretion to pro-
ceed in this manner and that the final documents signed are no less official 
because of the rather bizarre circumstances surrounding their birth. We do 
wish, however. to bring to the attention of this court the sincere belief of the 
Commission that these are generally distortive of the court's memorandum 
decision and tend to dwell excessively on these parts of the decision, and the 
evidence on which such decision was based, most favorable to appellants, 
and to slide rapidly through and often by those parts of the decision and 
e\idence more favoraule to the Commission. Specifically, we are concerned 
more about what is not in these documents than what is in them, and re-
spectfully submit that under controlling Utah Jaw [(Rule 52 (a), U.R.C.P.; 
see also Mendelson \'. Roland, 66 U. 487, 243 Pac. 798 (1926)] the lower 
court should have made additional findings in relation to such matters as 
the a\-eragc assessment levels of all classes of property in Utah County (and 
probably thro11gho11t the stale as well), and the failure of the Assessor of 
Utah Connry to inspeLt properties each year and keep assessments current, 
even though the e\idc·ncc in the recorcl on these matters is uncontroverted. It 
is rlwrf'fore particularly important that this court review the entire record 
in its rlelcrmi11<1tio11 of tl1c significant questions involved. 
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equally significant, question is to what relief, if any, they 
nre entitled if their challenge is successful. 
At the outset, it should be noted that a county, un-
like a nation or a state, is not a sovereign, but a wholly 
dependent entity empowered to exist by the state govern-
ment which created it and enjoying only those powers 
and duties expressly delegated to it by the creating sov-
ereign. It follows that a county board of equalization 
has no power except that specifically conferred upon it 
by the controlling constitutional and statutory law. 3 
Cooley, Law of Taxation, Sec. 1196 (1924); Fesler v. 
Bosson, 189 Ind. 484, 128 N.E. 145 (1920). 
It would appear that since a county board of equali-
zation has no inherent powers, that if it had the power 
to challenge an appraisal conducted by the state that this 
power would be spelled out or recognized in controlling 
statutory law. But no statute authorizes this type of a 
challenge, and its inappropriateness is obviously evi-
denced when the following facts are considered: 
1. Challenged are appraisals made by the state, orig-
inally with the cooperation of the office of the County 
Assessor of Utah County, and these appraisals were 
acquiesced in by the county and adopted by the county 
in early 1967, sent out in its assessment notices, and 
challenged only months thereafter. 
2. There is no claim by the county that there was any 
flaw in the appraisal technique and methodology em-
ployed, nor is there any evidence to the effect that there 
were any errors in the appraisals generally or, indeed, 
in any of them specifically. 
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3. 'l1he challenge \Vas framed iu part in terms of as-
sessment levels i11 other counties. \Ve submit that this 
is elearly outside of the arena of proper challenge, just 
as it would be outside of the province of a single taxpayer 
to claim that he is entitled to relief because another tax-
payer had a lower assessment level than his or in some 
way was evading taxes. To suggest that assessments in 
Orem must necessarily be invalid because they are higher 
than those now existing in Huntsville or Vernal is not 
only an invalid basis of attack, but irrelevant and mean-
ingless. 
Defendant is in a bit of a quandry in attempting to 
deal with that part of the lower court's decision dealing 
with assessment levels. It is pointed out that there is 
a wide discrepancy in valuation in the state (undisputed) 
and that the current cycle valuation program is taking 
considerably more than five years to complete (also un-
disputed). To jump from these facts, however, to the 
conclusion that valuations based upon recent expert ap-
praisals, closer than older valuations to both the statu-
tory standartl and the average assessment level (in com-
pliance with the uniformity and equality requirements) 
for all properties, are void, while assessments that have 
gathered dust on the books for about a decade, more 
variant than the challenged appraisals from both statu-
tory requirements antl the average assessment level are 
calid, is quite a leap; oue, indeed, that we are frankly 
unable to follow. The court's decision relied on no line 
of ease law for ::,;uch a massive voidance - we are un-
aware of tlw c,xisteuce of such a line - and, indeed, 
counsel fur plaintiffs in hi::,; memorandum and argument 
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offered no viable case precedent, or legal theory, for this 
type of relief in an action between governmental 
agenC;les. 
The decision does not attempt to deal with a number 
of pervasive problems implicit in the case, particularly, 
(1) the fact that the voidance of the challenged assess-
ments at least by implication validates pre-existing as-
sessments, whose contravention of the constitutional re-
quirements, seem both in terms of the statutory standard 
and in deviation from the prevailing assessment levels, 
was far greater than those struck down, and (2) what 
specific curative steps need to be taken to insure perpet-
uation of the reassessment program, either as it now 
exists or in the form the court feels it should have, and 
(3) the relationship of the level of the voided assess-
ments to assessment levels of other classes of property. 
These will be explored in this brief. 
The applicable constitutional provisions read: 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt un-
der the laws of the United States, or under this 
constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as provided by law. Ar-
ticle XIII, §2. 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all 
tanO'ible property in the state, according to its 
val~e in money and shall prescribe by law such 
regulations as ~hall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of such property, so that every person 
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to 
the value of his, hers, or its tangible property, 
* * *. Article XIII, §3. See § 59-5-1, Utah Code 
A1motated, as amended (1961). 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE REP-
RESENTED EACH OF THE AFFECTED 
TAXPAYERS (AND WE RESPECTFULLY 
SUBMIT THAT THIS IS A MOST DUBIOUS 
PROPOSITION) AND WERE ENTITLED TO 
THE COLLECTIVE RELIEF OF THESE 
TAXPAYERS, THE ONLY RELIEF AVAIL-
ABLE UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH LAW 
TO THEM WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF 
SUBJECT ASSESSMENTS TO THE A VER-
AG E ASSESSMENT LEVEL FOR ALL PROP-
ERTIES IN THE COUNTY, vVHICH LEVEL 
THEY ARE ALREADY BELOvV. 
Even if the court were to determine that the plain-
tiffs in this case had filed for and on behalf of each of the 
700 protesting taxpayers, only one of whom (Steven 
Hatch) is in fact a party to this action, or even if the 
court determined that it were a class suit and in some 
way the county officials could represent not just the 700 
who benefited from their ruling but the other 95.6 per 
cent of the 16,000 ·who paid at the higher tax rate (most 
remote), the relief granted by the lower court would not 
be appropriate. The logic underlying this contention is 
made clear by a review of the case law in the area. 
In the older cases, when an individual's property 
was assessed at a higher percentage of its value than 
other property, the aggrieved taxpayer had no enforce-
able remedy unless his assessm0nt was in excess of the 
statutory standard. The courts recognized conceptually 
his right to have all properties assessed according to 
the statutory standard to insure equal distribution of the 
tax burden, but offered no meaningful executory relief 
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~no matter how disproportionate his assessment might 
!JP in relation to those of his fellows. 12 
This approach, depriving as it did wronged persons 
oi' any meaningful redress, left considerable to be desired 
from the point of view of equity. A general awareness 
a rose that some effective remedy was needed, but it 
would have to be one which would at the same time in-
sure that each taxpayer bear his just and rightful share 
of the tax burden but not prove totally disruptive to the 
taxing process. Obviously, total chaos would follow if 
ewry person who could show his assessment to be high-
er than that of another person could simply have his 
asse8sment reduced to the lower level. This would also 
not clo equity, since the person with the lower assessment 
might have benefited by a mechanical or clerical error, 
and the intent of the legislature promulgating the tax 
law would thereby be frustrated, and revenues could 
never be reasonably predicted. The case law came quite 
naturally to a position that anyone whose assessment lev-
el required his assuming more than his share of the ad 
vnlorem tax burden ·was entitled, upon proper petition 
to a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, to have his assess-
nwnt reduced so that he would pay his fair share, and 
that this fair share could be determined by reference to 
tlie average or rnedian assessment level in the jurisdic-
tion or taxing unit in question. 
12 Typical cases reflecting this approach are City of Lowell v. County 
Co111111rs. ·of Middlesex, 152 Mass 372, 24 N.E. 469 (1890); State v. Cudahy 
Parking Co., 103 Minn. 419, 115 N.W. 645 (1908); ~oy~l Mfg. Co. v. Board 
of Eq11alizatio11, 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 Atl. 978 (1908); aff d, 18 N.J.L. 337, 74 At!. 
r,25 (JCl09); Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 757, 64 S.W. 193 (~901); and, as a con-
1u11porary anachronism, E. Ingraham Co. v. Town of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 
1:12 A.2d 563 (1957). 
23 
This coneept '.Vas firmly erystallized in the laud-
rna rk ('ase of Sioux City Brirl9e Cu. v. Dakota CowtfiJ, 
:2GO U. 8. 441, GI L.E(l. 387, 43 Sup. Ct. 190 (1923). A 
bridge had been assessed in tl1r State of Nebraska at 100 
per cent of its value, whereas locally-assessed property 
was being at the same time assessed at 011ly 53 per cent of 
its value. The N elJraska constitution provided that tax 
was to be paid on all property according to its value. 
The local tax officials refused to grant the bridge com-
pany the requested relief of lowering its assessment. 
The prevailing rule in Nebraska had been implementa-
tion of the traditional remedy above described which, of 
course, for practical purposes afforded no relief at all. 
rrhe Supreme Court of the United States, faced with 
the Nebraska ruling and inconsistent rulings from other 
states, noted jurisdiction and in an unanimous opinion, 
·with Chief Justice William Howard Taft speaking for 
the Court, ruled that the bridge company had a right to 
its remedy and that local law enforcement officials were 
obligated to secure uniformity of taxation between all 
classes of property. 
That aspect of the Sioux City Bridge case and the 
cases that follow it which assumes compelling signifiance 
in the iHstaut controversy, is the requirement that uni-
formity uml equality must exist not only within a class 
of prop<~rty, but between all properties without regard 
to class whenever the controlling constitutional language 
requires uniformity of valuation and assessment, and 
rnah·s no provision for classifieation of property for tax 
purposes. 
,\Iost of the cases ha\'e arisen because of practices 
of local assessing officials in taxing one class of property 
at a different rate than another. 13 
The principle of law enunciated by these cases, that 
where the constitution requires property be assessed ac-
(·ording to a standard of true value and makes no provi-
sion for discrimination between classes of properties, all 
classes arc required to bear their share of the tax load 
' 
is not only sound law, it is also just and logically correct. 
While it makes no sense for one homeowner to be dis-
criminated against in favor of another homeowner, it 
also makes no sense for a businessman to be discriminat-
ed against in favor of a railroad or an urban homeowner 
to he discriminated against in favor of a farmer. The 
constitutional standard in this state (see Point I) is 
equality and uniformity of all properties in all classes, 
1 l For example, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 214 
l\lrl. 550, 136 A.2d 567 (1957), which struck down lack of uniformity between 
1 ea! estate and inYentories; State ex rel Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax 
A/>J>eals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908, cert. den., 379 U.S. 818 (1964), 
wltich required uniformity among residential, commercial and unimproved 
realtv; Chicago B & QRR v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 170 
Nebr. 77, IOI N.W.2d 856 (1960), held that assessing locally-assessed propertv 
<it a lower rate than state-assessed property is discriminatory and arbitrary; 
in lJelligole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.W.2d 10 (1961), 
the court struck down a classification system adopted by local boards of 
a'sesmrs which led to assessment of different classes of properties at different 
rates. 
Sec also McLennan v. Undercof!er, Fulton Sup Ct., No. B-14129, August 
:n, 1%5 (CCH Georgia 200-135), appeal dismissed, 221 Ga. 613, 14_6 S.E.2d 
6'\r, (1966), supp. order, March 14, 1966 (CCH Georgia 200-146); Boise Com-
···1111i/\' Hotel v. Board of Equalization, Ada County, 391 P.2d 840 (Ida. 1964); 
liur/1: \. !Jrac/1111an, 4 Ariz. App. 55, 417 P.2d 689 (1966); People ex rel Calla-
lir11' 1. Gulf, l\I. & O.R.R., 8 lll.2<l 66, 132 N.E.2d 544 (1956); People ex rel 
H11/i·rm v. Chicago, B. & O.R.R., 22 Ill.2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961); and 
f:'!/1/11r \'. State Tax Coll/mission, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959). 
-1 hete is a whole line of New Jersev cases to this point. See, for example, 
lia/dwill Conslr. Co. v. E\Sex Coullty Bd. of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d 
5'!~ (l'l'i4), overruling Rowil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 76 N.J.L. 
402. 70 At!. g:·s (1908), atf'd 78 N.J.L. 337, 7'1 At!. 525 (1909); Gibraltar Cor-
' "!',"led Pa/1er Co. v. Town sh if> of Nort/1 Bergen, 20 N.J. _213, 119_ A.2d 135 
(i'l>'•); and the leading case in this line, Switz v. Township of Middletown, 
~·l :'-: .J. 580, 120 A.2d 15 (1957). 
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and not just within a given class, and controlling case law 
1s consistent therewith. 
In First Natio11al Bank of Nephi''· Christense11, :19 
Utah 5G8, 118 Pac.778 (1911), the plaintiff bank i1woked 
theo jurisdiction of the Fifth District Court to enjoin col-
lection of a tax alleged to have been wrongfully assessed. 
The District Court refused, and the Supreme Court up-
held the District Court, ruling that the plaintiff had not 
proven his claim of discriminatory taxation. In so rul-
ing, the court left no doubt that Utah stands in the main 
line of case law: 
Inequality and lack of uniformity may result not 
only by applying different rates of assessment, 
but also from misconduct of taxing officers by 
which property of one person, or a class of per-
sons, or a particular class of property, is inten-
tionally assessed at a valuation greater in pro-
portion to its real or cash value than is placed on 
the general mass of other taxable property. 
That is, though the Constitution and the statute 
require the taxing officers to assess all taxable 
property at ''its full cash value,'' yet, should tax-
iug officers of a county assess real estate, livr 
stock, merchandise and chattels at 60 to 70 per 
cent of their actual or cash value, and moneys or 
sliares of stock in manufacturing or industrial 
0nterprises, or i1westments, at their actual or 
cmih value, the assessment would not be eqnnl or 
uniform. 
Jn s11ch case, t71ose 11:lwse property was i11.feu-
tio11ally assessed at a higher percentage or val11a-
tio11 tlian was placed on the general mass of tax-
aufr 11ro7;erf.1J in tlie county may im•oke the aid of 
<·011rfs to co1111Jd the taring offiC'Prs to reduce tli1· 
1·.rc1·ss1rr assess11u'.1d so marle, to the same JJfO-
pnrtion of ralue as 11'a~ LJ1ocerl 11po11 the gel!eral 
mas_s of other taxalJle prnpedlf in flte cn1111ty. A 
demal of such right results in iner1uality and a 
want of uniformity in the assessment and taxa-
tion. Linly v. 2\lissouri, K. & T. Rv. Co. of TPx-
as, 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 8;)2; Ra}-moncl v. Chi-
cago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 
L.Ecl 78; Taylor\'. Louisville & N. R. Co., 88 Fed. 
364, 31 C.C.A. 537; 37 Cyr. 737. If, therefore, 
plaintiff's shares of stock were assessed at a 
value greater in proportion to that placed upon 
the general mass of taxable property in the coun-
ty, it is entitled to have that value reduced to the 
proportion placed on such mass of taxable prop-
erty ... specific instances here and there where a 
lower valuation in proportion to the actual or case 
value was placed on taxable property than was 
placed on plaintiff's vroperty do not, within thern-
selres, furnish sufficient ground for compla.int. 
To constitute such ground it rnust be made to ap-
pear that a greater valua.fion in proportion to the 
actual or cash value was placed on plaintiff's 
property than was placed on the general mass of 
taxable property in the county. (Emphasis 
added.) 
These principles were reaffirmed in Continental Bamk 
of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 179 Pac.67 
(1!119). The court there said: 
The proposition is incontrovertible, that, under 
the Constitution and laws above cited, taxation 
should he uniform upon all property ·within the 
jusdiction of the authority levying the tax. 
The Rppraisals of lands in Orem and Provo raised the 
an)ra{)'e assessment level in this land substantially above 
b 
th<' assessment lenl of land in other cities in Utah Coun-
h", hnt iwt up to either the legal standard or the average 
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assessment level of all classes of property in the county, 
as clearly set forth in the record (See tabulation, page 11 
of this brief). 
Some testimony was elicited as to the method of val-
uation of the classes of property listed in the tabulation. 
Land, buildings and personal property all have active 
markets and it is, therefore, possible to ascertain with 
limited difficulty and considerable accuracy their fair 
market value. 
Utilities are valued m this jurisdiction and in vir-
tually all jurisdictions according to a three-factor formu-
la. There is slight variation from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, but the factors here (and generally) used a re net 
book value of tangible property, operating income capi-
talized, and value of stock and debt outstanding (Tr. 
156). This system has evolved through decades of evo-
lution and is not fanciful or arbitrary, but is designed 
expressly to reflect the fair cash value of utility proper-
ties and is the best possible empirical standard of meas-
urement which has been discovered to value utility prop-
erties.14 
Mines are valued according to a specific statutory 
formula set forth in Section 59-5-57, Utah Code Anno-
tated, as amended (1963). 15 
14 The record reflects (Tr. 156-157) that several years ago, an independent 
group of experts tested our method of utility valuation. to d~ter~ine the 
degree of error. After making a_ ~omplete an~ thorough mvest1gat10n, then 
collecti,·e conclusion was that ut1ht1es were bemg taxed at a le\el of exactly 
28 per cent, which precisely wrroborated the State _Tax Commission's own 
figures. t-urther, the accuracy of this type of valuat10n procedure has been 
1 ~wg11 ized bv courts. Clticago B & Q R R \'. Stale Board of Equaltza/1011 
and AHe.1.\111ent, supra. 
1 s The legislature has ctetermincd that b~ application of this formula, _a 
tax will be imposed upon mines 1cp1csentat1ve of 30 per cent ot the tan 
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.. 
In summary, we suggest that even if the court as-
sumes that the plaintiffs are prosecuting this action in 
behalf of all affected taxpayers in Utah County - and 
we doubt that this is a valid assumption - all the relief 
tli ey would be entitled to would be the collective relief 
tli cse taxpayers would be entitled to; i.e., having their 
assessments changed to the arerage level of all proper-
ties in the county. Since the protested assessments al-
ready are below 21.38 per cent, the average level, it fol-
lows that there is no meaningful relief available. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLAR-
ING VOID THE VALUATIONS ARRIVED AT 
THROUGH THE COMMISSION'S APPRAIS-
ALS, SUCH APPRAISALS BEING PART OF 
A COMPREHENSIVE, SYSTEMATIC PLAN 
TO MAKE TAXATION OF ALL PROPER-
TIES IN THE STATE UNIFORM AND 
EQUAL AND CONSISTENT WITH THE CON-
STITUTION AL STANDARDS. 
To state that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief 
sought (and in part granted), however, is not ultimately 
dispositive of the basic problems involved. Inequities do 
exist; some citizens are absorbing a substantially larger 
market value. A unique problem exists in relation t.o valuation .of mines in 
th;it. unlike all other properties, the asset upon which the tax 1s to be ex-
t1 aned is hidden beneath the surrace of the ground and can be neither 
q:1:\l.titativly nor qualitativeh measured wi~h any precision._ B.ecau~ of this, 
fc11 nrnlas based on legal fictions are us~d m v1rtuallv a.11 iunsd1ct1ons, and 
our lormula and others have been sustamed as const1tut10nal, and as resu~t­
i11µ; in taxation which is in line with that of other classes of property, 111 
se1cral courts of appellate jurisdiction. 
In the context of the instant problem, however, mining assessment prob-
k111s are not significant since mining properties represent onl)' l.2 per cent 
ol the taxable prope1ty in Utah County. 
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share of the state's reveuue exactions than they should. 
The Commission has instituted a systematic program to 
alleviate this condition; the solution of the long-term 
problem depends upon the sustaining of this program 
or the implementation of an effective alternative (see 
Point IV). 
There is a line of cases, mostly of recent vintage, 
standing for the proposition that even though lack of 
uniformity and equality in valuation are present, if a 
systematic program is being followed leading to the cor-
rection of these problems, then temporary inequalities, 
even if resultant from the implementation of that 
program, will be overlooked in the interests of the 
greater good that ·will result through the program. 
The philosophy behind these cases is that in a mul-
tiple-year program, temporary inequalities will of ne-
cessity result, since those taxpayers whose lands have 
been most recently appraised will be paying on a higher 
assessed value because of inflation and other shifting 
market conditions than the remainder of their peers. 
Each year a different group of taxpayers will be thus 
affected, and the inequalities will tend to even out over 
the period of an appraisal cycle. 
Recognized as among the leading cases are Board of 
County Commissioners v. State Board of Equalization, 
363 P.2u 242 (Okla., 1961), and eleven sister cases re-
ported immediately following. The fact situations are 
much like the instant case. The state taxing authority 
determined that there existed a discriminatory situation 
in that rural properties were assessed at a lower rate 
than urban propc·1·ties, and ordered the rate of the for-
mer to be raised at a greater rate than the latter, in seek-
ing to arrive at state·wicle uniformity over a period of a 
few years. rrhe county boards n~fused to comply and, 
issue l1eing joineu, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma sus-
tained the state authority's position, even though tempo-
rary lack of uniformity was clearly present. The con-
curring opinion of Justice Irwin, quoted here in part, is 
particularly instructive: 
In my judgment, inequalities in valuations existed 
within some counties and between the several 
counties for many years before the State Board of 
Equalization rendered its order. And in my judg-
ment, the Order does not adjust and correct the 
inequalities as it is apparent inequalities still 
exist. However, the Order of the State Board of 
Equalization did remove some of the inequalities 
and is a step toward granting to all the taxpayers 
their right to have their property assessed equally 
and uniformly with the property of every other 
taxpayer. 
The question then arises: "Where the Constitu-
tion and the statutes provide that the State Board 
of Equalization shall adjust and equalize the val-
uations, is an order which only tends to adjust and 
equalize valuations valid 1'' 
The Tax Commission found in substance that to 
completely adjust and equalize the valuations in 
a single order or in any one year, "would create 
an undue hardship on all concerned .... " 
In my judgment, a reasonable and practical inter-
pretation of our Constitution and statutory pro-
vision authorizes and empowers the State Board 
of Equalization to render the Order appealed 
from. 
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In Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 
71 A.2d 47 (1960), a statutory plan providing for a four-
year appraisal cycle in Cook County, Illinois, was up-
held even though the court noted that complete uniform-
ity did not exist in any single year. And in Rogan v. 
Counly Commissioners of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 
71 A.2d 47 (1950), a five-year program was sustained in 
face of constitutional attack. The county commissioners 
were required to follow the equalization directives of the 
State Tax Commission, of which the appellant Rogan was 
chairman. 
A similar result was reached in Hamilton v. Adkins, 
et al., 250 Ala. 557, 35 So.2d 183 (1948), cert. den. 335 
U.S. 861. The court held: 
Where there is a review of only a portion of the 
real estate in the county done in good faith and 
looking to a plan to equalize values of all property 
as promptly as possible, this should be considered 
on the question of intentional discrimination. 
The fact that a reappraisal program results in very dra-
matic boosts in valuation in some areas while others re-
main untouched is in itself no grounds for invalidation. 
In Wild Goose Country Club v. Butte County, 60 Cal. 
App. 339, 212 Pac. 711 (1923), a precursor of the more 
recent decisions above cited, after setting forth an ex-
celent definition of market value (" ... not ... value ... 
for a particular purpose, but ... value in view of all 
the purposes to which it [the property] is naturally 
adapted"), the court sustained a ten-fold single-year 
increase in valuation 011 some properties, while others 
n•fl<:'cted no increase at all lweause there \Vas not suffi-
ricut time to adjust all in a single year. See also People 
Y. On:is, et al., 301 Ill. 350, 133 N.E. 787, 24 A.L.R. 325 
(1D21). 
The lower court evidenced concern about the time 
lapse. It is true that most of the cases involve programs 
taking five years or less although in one, Bade v. Drach-
man, 4 Ariz. App. 55, 417 P.2d 689 (1966), a ten-year pro-
gram was upheld at least by implication. vVe would re-
:,;pectfully suggest that more important than the time 
question is the question of whether or not the challenged 
program tends to promote uniformity and equity in its 
over-all impact. Based upon this standard, we submit 
that the Tax Commission's program should be sustained. 
As a result of the reappraisal program conducted in 
Utah County, uniformity of land valuation was achieved 
within Provo and Orem, and assessed valuations of land 
iu these cities were brought closer to the county-wide 
<fferage assessment level of all properties. The quality 
of prevailing valuations was substantially raised, as evi-
denced by the lowered coefficients of dispersion. 
'l1here is another argument for sustaining the Tax 
Commission's plan. A reappraisal program must start 
somewhere, and if county officials could negate valuations 
merely because they were made in that county and not 
uhwwhere, the program would never get off the ground. 
'110 create absolute equality, of course, all appraisals would 
Jiayc to be made at a single given moment in time, which 
is, of course, impossible. Indeed, in this jurisdiction, it 
is also not possible to complete them in a single year, 
and no statute contemplates completion in a single year. 
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Co1w0ptnally, it is impossible to ever complete this type 
of program, because of inflation and other economic 
fiuctua tions. One witness, in fact, used the word "i11fii1-
i ty" (Tr. 148) in referring to the program's duration. 
It is imperative, however, that continuous diligence be 
applied to keep up as much as possible, and the record 
shows that the Tax Commission is about keeping up in 
spite of extreme limitations in moneys and manpower 
(Tr. 199-200). The record also clearly shows that the 
basic reason that the assessment level is out of joint in 
the first place and the Commission called upon to set it 
right, is the almost total default of the assessors of the 
various counties. What the Commission has been doing 
since the legislative mandate of 1953, in large part, is 
merely cleaning up someone else's mess. 
Further, sustaining the lower court's ruling would 
have the effect of scuttling the only systematic and mean-
ingful program now being conducted in the State of Utah 
to bring land values up to the values of other properties. 
Utah County ha8 no program to correct the inequities 
·which now exist; indeed, all the evidence suggests that 
the affected officials would be perfectly satisfied with an 
infinite perpetuation of these inequities. This approach 
might seem some·what mmsual in view of the clear and 
cou vincing constitutional mandates, hut is in fact quite 
common, the political realities being what they are (see 
exploration of tho8e realities in Point IV). No county 
in the state, in fact, has a viable program at th0 present 
time to bring onler into assessment chaos aml insure that 
all its citize11s are taxPcl equally according to the consti-
tutional a11d satutory requirement8, and it is doubtful 
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tlwt any county has at its disposal the means, manpower 
arnl expertise available to even attempt such a program. 
1'lw counties differ only in the degree of their coopera-
tion in the Commission's program. 
The court's attention is directed to one of the sev-
Prnl paradoxes in this case. The Legislature of the State 
of Utah promulgated a law stating that the Commission 
should complete cyclical state-wide assessments every 
five years; but since that program has consistently re-
fused to appropriate sufficient funds to make possible 
m'en approximate compliance with its directive. The 
record is clear that the Tax Commission has continuously 
attempted to secure more realistic appropriations for 
this program (Tr. 121), and has done as well as it could 
in utilizing available funds in its county-by-county ap-
11raisal program. And now, because of the fact that the 
legislature has failed to grant sufficient moneys to effec-
tuate its own manifest intent, the Commission's efforts 
to implement that intent and bring to pass compliance 
with constitutional standards have been struck down and 
declared void. It should be noted again, and stressed, 
that the Commission's plan has been judged to be defi-
<'ient only in the time of implementation factor. 
According to the most reasonable interpretation of 
the evidence presented, the Commission has adopted 
rnlicl criteria in determining where to send its apprais-
<'rs; has implemented these criteria without favoritism; 
litrn employed qualified personnel; has conducted a pro-
gram utilizing accepted mass appraisal procedures, in-
eluding study of available sales data, physical inspection 
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of all the premises involved and consultation with local 
experts in the various counties, and has made a substan-
tial inroad into the problem. The Commission's program 
for land valuation is part of a larger integrated program 
to aehieve equalization among the various elasses of 
property; the program has been carefully thought out 
and expertly implemented. 
It is impossible to exactly project the time that will 
be required to complete the current cycle. 16 
Finally, it should be continually borne in mind that 
because of the criteria utilized by the Commission to de-
termine deployment of appraisers, those areas most out 
of line with the norm, and in the most centralized and dy-
namic parts of the various counties and thus most need-
ing work, have been done and are being done (Tr. 206-
207). 
The lower court, in its memorandum decision (R. 
151) noted that it could not be said that the legislature in 
view of this case would not make means available to the 
Commission to comply with the law the legislature itself 
i 60fficial documents prepared by the Tax Commission, however, show 
that in 1967 the assessed valuation of all property in the state was 
$1,612.084,938, of which $231,465,584 was real estate. Approximately 
$106,000,000 of this real estate is in Salt Lake County. Since the record 
shows that 45 per cent, plus 17 ,000 parcels (Tr. 198, 254) of this has been 
completed and about 50 per cent of Utah County has been completed, when 
these are added with the other percentages, a reasonable estimate is that 
about 40 per cent of the land in the state, based on the value thereof, has 
been reappraised in the curre:1t cycle. Based upon percentage of area or 
number of parcels, however, this figure would be lower; we respectfully 
submit, however.that neither of these is as meaningful as. an est.imate based 
upon assessed valuation. A simple aueage percentage is part1cula1·Jy dis· 
tortive, sinu· it would gin' comparable weight to an acre. of waste. land in 
west Juab County and the acre in Salt Lake City on wh1d1 the l\ennecott 
Build.ing sits. Somewhat mo1e 111eaning1 ul would be an estimate based_ upon 
tile nu~ber of parn:ls, but this would still be of dubious import smce the 
si1e and value of sud1 parcels would vaq enormous]). 
:-rn 
]1n:-; passed. rrhis observatio11 is sound, and there are 
sea ttered encouraging signs that a greater degree of leg-
isla tivc cooperation may be in the offing. This being 
tlw case, it seems premature at this time to strike down 
Utah County assessments the first year they were placed 
on the rolls. Perhaps if these assessments had been on 
the rolls for five years and Utah County residents paid 
higher taxes for that period than the other citizens of 
the 1itate, there might be some justification for this type 
of relief; but the opinion itself recognizes the possi-
bility that by 1971 - five years hence - the situation 
may be substantially changed, and we would suggest 
that to void these assessments based upon any kind of a 
projection - when the record reflects both the fragility 
and contingency of any such projection and the real pos-
sibility of an accelerated effort - is unnecessarily harsh 
and clearly erroneous. 
POINT IV. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS DISCRE-
TION IN THE CASE TO REQUIRE BY ITS 
EDICT STATE-WIDE UNIFORMITY WITH-
IN A SPECIFIED TIME, THE EXERCISE OF 
WHICH DISCRETION WOULD BE ALTO-
GETHER APPROPRIATE AND IS RESPECT-
FULLY INVOKED. 
The appeal made by the defendant to this honorable 
comt includes not only a plea for reversal of certain 
parts of the lower court's ruling, but also (framed in the 
alternative) a request for this honorable court "to make 
:-;nd1 further and additional orders, including the grant-
lllµ: of extraordinary relief consistent with the pleadings 
37 
and e\'idence herein, as the court deems necessary, just 
and proper iu the premises to affirm the validity of the 
state->vide reassessment program of the Utah State Tax 
Commission or to otherwise insure expeditious state-
wide compliance with constitutional and statutory pro-
visions relating to the valuation, assessment and taxa-
tion of property" ( R. 209). 
This language was included to bring before this hon-
orable court a possibility for resolution which has been 
employed in other jurisdictions with increasing fre-
(1uency when courts have been faced with the type of 
question here presented. In a persuasive line of cases, 
courts of general jurisdiction in various states have 
simply ordered state and local taxing officials to bring 
assessments in line with the constitutional or statutory 
standard within a specified period of time. These cases, 
in their essential thrust and philosophy, are very much 
like f'ertain recent and highly publicized cases in which 
courts have exercised their powers to insure enforce-
ment of civil rights laws or effect overdue legislative 
reapportionment. 
It is recognized that this type of judicial interposi-
tion is extraordinary and only unusual circumstances 
and questiomi of grave public importance justify the 
type of relief here suggested. It is respectfully submit-
ted, howt>ver, that such circumstances and questions arc 
here abulldantly present, and this case is particularly 
suited for that type of resolution. 
Defemlm1t argued for this type of relief in the trial 
]i(~low. ThP trial ccmrt <1i<l 11ot rule on the merits of the 
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argument but, noting that it could uot make such a ruling, 
:rn:.;·gestocl that the relief might be considered hy a court 
of laHt resort (R. 151). Defendant is of the opinion 
that the lower court's restraint was probably justified, 
nm1 in fact requested and argued for that relief for pur-
posPs of this appeal. Defendant respectfully suggests 
tlia t the question of this relief is properly before this 
lio11orahle court, and that this court clearly has power to 
grnnt it if deemed appropriate. 
This court is a superior court of general appellate 
jurisdiction, and as such possesses inherent powers, 
''and the jurisdiction of such a court is not to be re-
Hti·ided except by the unequivocally expressed will of the 
legislature." 21 C.J.S. Courts§ 238 (1940). This court 
has held that it is the exclusive judge of its own juris-
didion. National Bank of Hailey v. Lewis, 13 Utah 507, 
±5 Pac. 890 (1896). Not only do we submit that this 
honorable court has power to grant this type of relief, 
hut that it could, in fact, do so on its own motion without 
the urging of any of the parties here before it. 
There are several reasons why this type of dispo-
sition might be in the public interest. First, it would 
111we tho effect of laying the entire controversy to rest 
hy solving the underlying problem. A narrow decision, 
confined strictly to the Utah County facts will in no 
sense solve the basic problem, which is statewide. It 
wonlcl not end the inequities and discriminations now 
rnmpant. Only a broad decision striking at the roots 
of the problem would insure that all persons in the state 
ill't' taxed proportionally to the value of their property as 
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intended by the framers of the constitution and the le" 
,..., 
isl a tu re of this state, and only a broad decision would 
extricate the assessors of the various counties from the 
cruel quandry in which they now find themselves. Such 
a decisiou, ultimately dispositive of the basic problem, 
would also avoid a multiplicity of suits. 17 
Another reason for a final determination of the ulti-
mate and underlying problem by judicial mandate is that 
the experience of sister jurisdictions is that it is a type 
of problem that has proven most difficult to solve 011 po-
litical level. The type of widespread, systematic under-
assessment of real property, and particularly rural real 
property we are here faced with is by no means unique to 
Utah, but is generally found - and has for decades been 
generally found - throughout the country. The expla-
nation for this lies in the very obvious and direct corre-
lation between low taxes and political success, and the 
even more obvious and direct correlation between high 
taxes and lost elections. The learned Thomas M. Cooley 
dealt with this problem in his definitive treatise: 
In general, the people submit to taxation as a hard 
necessity; and as every individual is likely to be 
impressed with a conviction that the laws seldom 
or never operate with equality or justice, he is 
also likely to be entirely willing to make his caRe 
one that shall escape the heavy burdens. The tax 
official is therefore expected to enforce the law 
against a community, the members of which ex-
1 7 Defendant is now aware of two additional suits dealing directly with 
this problem which have been filed and are probably headed for. th.is forum 
unless the decision in this case fully resolves the controversy, and 1s mforrned 




cuse to themselves an evasion of its provisions on 
the ground that even then they perform their du-
ties as nearly as do the others upon whom the like 
duty rests; and will feel, if compulsory steps are 
taken against them, something like a sense of per-
sonal wrong. The difficulty is complicated by the 
fact that the officers who make the assessments 
are chosen by the people assessed, and as the local 
assessments are usually made the basis for state 
taxation, their constituents will expect them to 
make the valuations sufficiently low to protect 
them against unfair assessments elsewhere. The 
sense of official duty must be strong and the firm-
ness considerable that can resist under such cir-
cumstances the pressure for some departure from 
the strict rule of law; and the conclusive evidence 
that it is not always resisted is found in the notor-
ious fact that men who take solemn oath to per-
form to the best of their ability the duty of assess-
ing property at its fair cash value are accustomed 
to assess it at from one-fourth to two-fifths only, 
excusing their disobedience of the law on the gen-
eral disobedience of others. 4 Cooley, Law of 
Taxation, § 1597 (1924). 
It is clear, in light of the experience of other juris-
dictions and in light of the monetary and personnel prob-
lems previously discussed, that to expect elected officials 
( ai1d particularly elected officials in small, rural coun-
ties), and those appointed by elected officials, to make 
:-;c•rious inroads on this problem which would lead to 
<'xpeditious solution is something less than realistic. This 
i:-; nowhere more vividly illustrated than in the resistance 
of Utah County officials to the proposed increase in 
rnlnes which precipitated this action. 
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These pro bl ems, as they exist in this jurisdiction, 
were explored in considerable detail in a broad historical 
and legal frame of reference, and with cogent comme 11 _ 
tary, in an article entitled Property Tax Assessment aud 
the Utah Constitution - A Taxpayer's Dilemma, which 
appeared in the September, 1966 (Vol.1966-No. 2) Utah 
Law Review. After examining the nature of ad valorem 
taxation and clarifying a number of commonly-held mis-
conceptions about it, author Denis R. Morrill came to a 
number of conclusions which are particularly germane to 
this controversy, and the article is therefore particularly 
recommended to the court for its perusal. 
l\fr. l\forrill noted that "statistics show that not one 
taxing district in the state is complying with this law 
[setting the standard of value for tax purposes]" and 
that "the standard [of value] remains subject to the ab-
solute control of the county assessor.'' He discussed at 
some length the same type of political considerations that 
concerned Mr. Cooley (evidencing that the basic prob-
lem has changed very little in forty-four years) and addi-
tional pressures on local officials to keep assessments low. 1 
These pressures result from the state-wide levies, one of 
which (the uniform school fund, the operation of ·which 
is explored in defendant's reply brief) is very substan-
tial, and certain government aid programs which make it 
possible for a district or county to receive direct mone-
tary benefits by keeping assessments low. The prohlrm 
with such aid, not particularly significant at present iu 
terms of moneys i1wolved hut with a great potential for 
Jong-term mischief, is thus defined by l\f r. Morrill: 
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" ... by a process of undervaluation the assessor 
can project an image of his county \vhich is far 
from correct, and this distorted image of the rela-
tin• prosperity of the area is then usecl by the 
graut-in-aicl agency as a lrnsis for the !.~Tai;t. In 
this manner, when one county receives aicl which a 
neighboring county does not. clue to the higher as-
sessed valuation, lack of uniformity is indirectly 
promoted. The county that pays the least amount 
of property tax in relation to the fair cash value 
of its property receives the greater amount of aicl 
money. From this situation has arisen the prac-
tice of "competitive unclervalua ti on," each coun-
ty trying to project the bleakest image possible in 
order that it might receive a larger share of aid 
funds. It should be evident that such a practice 
does not promote equity." 
:Jlr. Morrill's conclusions, based upon the most 
comprehensive non-governmental study ever made of 
Utah property tax practices and problems, are most en-
lighteuing: 
The state legislature has long been aware of the 
flagrant disregard of the law in administrat·ive 
procedures but has done rery little to remedy the 
situation. State tax administrators are keenly 
cognizant of the existing problems, but their 
hands are effectively tied by constitutional, leg-
islative or political strings ... while practical pol-
itics pids pressure on local assessors to disobey 
the law. (Emphasis supplied) 
'l1he court's attention is now directed to the cases in 
\\"l1ieh court of ultimate jurisdiction in the several states 
lww ordered state and local taxing officials to bring as-
SPssments in line with constitutional and statutory stand·· 
n rd,-., within a given period of time. One of the earliest 
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of these was Switz v. Township of Middleton, supra. A 
key aspect of the holding of this case, and one which char-
acterizes the entire line, vrns the retention of jurisdiction 
by the court to insure that its mandate was properly 
carried out. 
In Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965 ), thr 
opinion opens with this most arresting statement: 
From all accounts the tax roll of Duvall County 
for 1964 is a mess. 
The court noted the constitutional requirement (Fla. 
const. Art. IX, § 1) of "just valuation" and the statu-
tory directive that property be assessed ''at its full 
cash value.'' It then spoke of the ''enormousness of the 
circumvention of the command of the constitution''; 
and, after digressing a bit to comment on the difficultie~ 
of the problem involved, held that "revaluation and re-
assessment should be immediately accomplished.'' 
Probably the prototype of the cases in this line is 
Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). In its 
opinion the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the 
existence and scope of the underassessment problem with 
relation to local properties was "common knowledge." 
After observing that the situation was getting worse 
instead of better, the court held that compliance with 
the constitutional stamlard must be achieved as of the 
11ext January 1 (1966). All taxing officers were to be 
held strictly accountable therefor. The remand to the 
district court by the Supreme Court ordered the clistrid 
ju<lge to direct the state revenue commissioner to "ad-
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' 1 ;-;e awl instruct" all county tax commissioners of their 
asseHsment duties under the constitution, of the scope of 
the Supreme Court's opinion, and specifically directed 
the district court to retain the case on its docket to insure 
compliance. 18 
The controlling constitutional prov1s10n ( § 172 of 
the Kentucky Constitution) sets forth a "fair cash 
Yalue'' standard for property taxation. 
The State of Tennessee subsequently made a similar 
ruling in Southern Railway Co. v. Clement, 415 S.W.2d 
146 (Tenn. 1966). A particularly flagrant discrimination 
waR here present since locally-assessed property was 
asRcssed at 10 per cent of fair cash value and state-as-
sessed railway property at 100 per cent of fair cash 
value. The court issued a prospective ruling that all 
aRsessments at less than actual cash value would hence-
forth be considered void. 
In Hanks v. State Board of Equalization, 90 Cal. 
Hptr. 478 (1964), a California District Court of Appeal 
rrfused to issue a mandate to require all property to be 
18 The Kentucky Legislature reacted to this decision by passing a law 
which sets limits on revenue taken in, to insure that the assessment adjust-
ments did not result in a financial bonanza for the various counties at the 
expense of the taxpayers. 
Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue J. E. Luckett made this comment 
after the adfustments had been made: 
It was probably a wise decision on the part o~ the court. - alt~ough 
we didn't think so at the time - to order the Job done 1mmed1ately, 
that is by the next assessment per~od: If more ~ime had b~en given, 
strung out over a period of years, It 1s doubtful 1f a better ]Ob ~~uld 
have resulted. There would have been a tendency to put off dec1~10ns 
and stultify the whole effort through m~ss confusion and uncerta1.nty. 
~lachiavelli was right - cut off the dogs tail all at once;, not a h_ttle 
piece at a time. J. E. Luckett, '_'Experiment in Democracy, Proceedings 
uf t/1e ... National Tax Association, 1966 (Columbus, 1967). 
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assessed ''in proportion to its value'' as specified in the 
constitution of the state (Art. XIII (~ 7), but accom-
plished the same end in its insistence on a uniform frac-
tion of that value for all classes of property. 
One case on the periphery of this line is of particu-
lar interest, since it involves many of the same concepts 
as the instant problem and arose in a neighboring state. 
In Southern Pac. Co. v. Cohise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 377 
P.2d 770 (1963), the plaintiff railroad sued to recover 
taxes paid under protest, alleging discriminatory as-
sessment. Its property was assessed at 89 per cent of 
its full cash value, county-assessed property at no more 
than 20 per cent. 19 
After recognizing the validity of the plaintiff rail-
·way 's claim of discrimination, indeed ref erring to it 
as a matter of ''public notoriety,'' the court made the 
following statement: 
The absent persons here are the other taxpayers 
in the state and the counties affected. There (sic) 
rights cannot be injuriously affected by a decree 
of court in this litigation since they have no right 
other than that the tax laws be administered as 1 
written, fairly and without discrimination. Were 
the ultimate judgment to go agai11st appellee, tax-
payers would have no right injuriously affected 
thereby for they have no right to perpetuate diR-
criminatory acts by public officials even though in 
a measure they profit therefrom. 
The court noted that great financial havoc would result 
hy simply refunding the railroad's taxes, stating that the 
1 9 The constitution of the State of Arizona permits classification (art. 
IX ~ 1), but the court noted that the Arizona Legislature had not 1m 
pl;m'ented this language to establish classes and there was therefore no basis 
for discrimination. 
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8h1te's power to make refunds "does not extend to its 
O\nt destructio11. '' 
It is to be noted that most of these cases are very re-
re11t. 'rhis is clearly the ascendant approach to cases 
imoking wide-sprea<l assessment and taxation inequali-
ties an<l evidences courts becoming increasingly aware 
- primarily through assessment level studies - of the 
futility of stop-gap solutions. 
Defendant is keenly cognizant that the question of 
whether or not this type of order is to be issued in this 
proceeding is wholly within the discretion of the court. 
It is equally cognizant, however, that in all probability 
only this type of order will be ultimately dispositive of 
the basic problem here before the court and avoid the 
necessity of the question being brought before the court 
again and again. We submit respectfully that it is clear-
ly within the power of the court to issue an order requir-
ing taxing officials on state and local levels to cooper-
ati\'ely bring the level of assessment throughout the state 
up to the statutory standard within a reasonable period 
of time, which would cause the legislature and boards of 
county commissioners to make the means available to 
bring to pass compliance ·with the court's mandate. In 
defendant's opinion, three to five years >vould be a rea-
sona lile period. 
POINT V 
THE LOvVER COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE UTAH 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION COM-
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PLIED IN SUBSTANCE \VITH THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 59-7-1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1963), AND THA 11 THE 
F~QUALIZATION ACTIONS TAKEN THERE-
AFTER BY THE STATE TAX CO~IMISSION 
\VERE VOID BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SEC-
TION 59-5-47, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1959). 
These statutes define powers of the two goYern-
mental bodies involved in this action, and the manner in 
which these should be exercised, and are thus part and 
parcel of the problems relating to these powers which 
will be considered in the responsive brief. It would, 
however, not be inappropriate to summarize respond-
ent's position at this time: 
(1) Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1963), 
quoted on page 13 of this brief, is jurisdictional, and a 
large number of the actions purportedly taken there-
under by the Utah County Board of Equalization are 
fatally defective because of abandonment of the Consti-
tutional valuation standard and failure to act within 
the mandatory time period. The time problem could, 
and should, have been solved by requesting permission 
to reconvene. 
(2) In its subsequent actions, the Commission com-
plied with the substance of Section 59-5-47, Utah Code 
Annotated ( 1959) (quoted in responsive brief), which 
sliould be interpreted permissively and liberally in the 
interests of uniformity of assessmeut and taxation, aml 
the Commission's actions thereunder sustained. 
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( 3) In the alternative, if the Tax Commission's 
actiom; are not sustainable under Section 59-5-47, they 
nre sustainable under Section 59-5-46, Utah Code Anno-
tatc(l (1959) and/or Section 59-7-13, Utah Colle Anno-
tated (1961) (both set forth in the responsive brief). 
These problems relating to the procedural sufficiency 
of certain steps in the controversy are clearly of lesser 
import, ~when compared to the questions relating to the 
r:·clical assessment program previously explored, but 
arc hy no means insignificant. 
CONCLUSION 
This honorable court has a number of options in its 
cfo:position of this matter. Because of the widespread 
public concern in the outcome of this case, the compel-
ling problems existing statewide in relation to property 
assessment, the almost certainty that a narrowly-drawn 
decision confined strictly to the Utah County problem 
will result in this honorable court (and several other 
courts) again facing the same basic questions, the de-
sirability of finally laying the problem to rest, and the 
difficulties inherent in alternative avenues of solution, 
we respectfully urge the court to fully exercise its pow-
c·rs in resolution of that part of this case which deals 
with the Commission's state\vide reassessment program 
a11cl the discrepancies in assessment levels to bring to 
pass nniformity in assessment and taxation in order that 
no citizen of the state be further required to assume 
a lnrger share of the general tax burden of the state than 
i:~ justly his. 
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This type of disposition would be iu complete har-
mony with the pleadings and the evidence. This action 
was framed in terms of declaratory judgment law, which 
grants broad discretionary powers to fully lay to rest 
existing controversies. That law has ''its purpose ... 
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and inse-
curity with respect to rights, status and other legal re-
lations; and [it] is to be liberally construed and admin-
istered." Section 78-33-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
See also Sections 78-33-5 and 78-33-6, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
The public issues here involved far transcend any 
partisan question as to who "wins" and who "loses"; 
the interest of all parties to this case, and indeed of all 
Utahns, in an efficient and equitable tax administration 
is common. We respectfully urge this honorable court 
to keep these considerations uppermost at all times, and 
make that disposition of the case that would best insure 
just, uniform and efficient administration of ad valorern 
taxes throughout the state. vVe further respectfully sug-
gest that this disposition would be to find generally on 
the salient issues in favor of the respondent State Tax 
Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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